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Abstract 
 
Since the economic and managerial fields integrated the Internet tool, new opportunities were created. 
Among them, information management aiming at helping to make the "best choices" became a central 
topic in e-management. New types of intermediaries appeared in the virtual world as 
`interorganizational information systems’. Actors who join these systems and take part in the 
development of these virtual commercial places play an atypical game: on the one hand, they 
cooperate in the same virtual entity of reticular form and, on the other hand, they remain individually 
in competition with one another since they are in a common market with comparable goods and 
services.  How should we address this competitive game? Our paper tries to answer this question by 
qualifying the collaboration of “coopetition” between platform members and competition between 
various online platforms. Moreover, in order to avoid any confusion, we propose a distinction between 
`electronic marketplaces' and `online information platforms'. We apply our general analysis to the 
case of e-tourism. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The integration of the Internet within human organizations and, in particular, in the mechanisms of 
business administration has already caused multiple organizational changes. Some economic actors 
disappeared while other actors appeared because of the opportunities created by the Internet and, in a 
more general way, by the revolution associated with the information and communication technologies 
(ICT). 
 
Among these new actors of the virtual economic field, we find the interorganizational information 
systems (IIS), which enable buyers and sellers to participate in a common market to exchange 
information on the products, to compare the characteristics of various products and, if necessary, to 
carry out online transactions. The IIS are perceived at the same time as means of treating and 
diffusing information, and as new resources enabling firms to increase their competitiveness (Baile 
and Trahand, 1999). Within the framework of this article, we propose to distinguish between two 
types of virtual places: the electronic marketplaces (EMP) and the online information platforms 
(OIP). Whereas the first type allows buyers and sellers to operate and to conclude online transactions, 
the second type focuses more specifically on the informational exchange without playing a role in the 
transaction. 
 
The two types of IIS often coexist within the same sector. For instance, in the tourism sector, online 
directories (OD) are an example of OIP. Their business is defined by the gathering of the whole 
existing and recognized supply of holiday services (flights, accommodations, leisure parks, 
restaurants, etc.). This information is then available on one place (the OIP’s website) in order to 
propose an aggregate offer to the attention of buyers (tourists seeking places for their next holiday 
time). On the other hand, online booking centers (OBC) are an example of EMP; these virtual travel 
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agencies allow users to choose a product, to carry out the reservation, and even to secure the payment 
of the stay by electronic payment. 
 
Going beyond the mere terminological distinction between EMP and OIP, we aim to analyze the main 
similarities and differences between these two types of IIS. On the one hand, the two types are both 
characterized by the paradox of any participation in an IIS: by offering similar goods and services, all 
the suppliers present on an EMP or an OIP are competitors, but at the same time they collaborate in 
making this virtual marketplace successful. On the other hand, EMP and OIP differ in the services 
they offer to their participants, but compete for the participation of the same sets of users (basically, 
sellers and buyers). Moreover, the competition between EMP and OIP takes place within an intricate 
web of externalities: (i) within an IIS, there are indirect network externalities (buyers favor the 
participation of more sellers and sellers favor the participation of more buyers); also, because sellers 
compete with one another, there are negative externalities among them; (ii) across different IIS, the 
benefits offered to users by one IIS are likely to spill over to another IIS (because users can 
“multihome”, i.e., they can register with several IIS) and free-riding may then occur.  Our objective in 
this article is to propose a rigorous framework in order to disentangle these various effects and, 
thereby, to highlight the main management issues surrounding competition and cooperation both 
within and among IIS. Throughout the paper, we illustrate our general analysis through the case of e-
tourism (with a special focus on the nature-based tourism sector). 
 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we replace the concept of IIS in its 
context, namely the context of market intermediation. We contrast the theories of “disintermediation” 
and “re-intermediation”; we describe how infomediation is a concept that rises directly from the “re-
intermediation” theory and, thereby, we explain why it is necessary to distinguish between EMP and 
OIP. . In Section 3, we study the collaboration paradox on an OIP by referring to the concept of 
coopetition, which combines competition and cooperation. In Section 4, we formalize the intuitions 
drawn from the previous sections by analyzing developing an industrial organization model. In 
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Section 5, we broaden the perspective by considering the competition between several IIS. Finally, in 
Section 6, we conclude by stating a number of important questions and issues for future theoretical 
and empirical research. 
 
2. Intermediation and ICT 
 
In order to understand what an IIS is and what are the implications of the distinction between EMP 
and OIP, it is necessary to refer to the intermediation theory. Actually, these virtual entities are 
concretely represented by intermediaries, whose functions rise directly from the evolution of the 
intermediation in parallel with the evolution of ICTs over the last decades. 
 
An intermediary is an economic agent who helps a supplier/seller and a buyer/consumer to meet and 
to carry out a particular transaction, either by buying to the supplier in order to resell to the purchaser, 
or by simply helping these two protagonists to find each other (Spulber, 1996). Let us notice that in 
both cases, the intermediary does not derive any utility from the consumption of the exchanged goods 
(Biglaiser, 1993). His profit either comes from the margin of its buy and resell operations or is 
represented by the wage for his intermediation role. The work of an intermediary generally leads to a 
centralized offer by minimizing research costs for the two parts of the transaction (Rubinstein and 
Wolinsky, 1987). 
 
2.1 The theory of disintermediation 
 
With the development of ICTs and more specifically the Internet, the traditional intermediary enters 
reluctantly in direct competition with decentralized electronic exchanges where consumers and 
producers meet in order to negotiate directly the final prices and the transaction terms. The Internet is 
thus perceived as a virtual means that establishes direct relations between suppliers and consumers. 
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This is the central assumption of the disintermediation theory, which contends a gradual elimination 
of the various actors of the value chain (Malone and all, 1987). 
 
However, there are several reasons for which this assumption cannot be validated in its extreme 
version (disappearance of any economic actor acting as an intermediary). Firstly, it is difficult to 
believe in a completely digitalized market because of technological barriers. Undeniably, the current 
state of technology does not make it possible to find satisfactory electronic equivalent for all types of 
transactions. Secondly, the concerned actors may not always find it beneficial to make the 
transactions become entirely electronic, be it for strategic reasons or even to ensure that information 
remains private (Brousseau, 2002). Finally, the producer is not always able to ensure a routing of his 
products towards the purchaser. Indeed, even if negotiations, contractual agreement and invoicing 
(electronic payment) can be made digital, the routing of the product remains a material problem. The 
space proximity and the physical meeting between protagonists thus remain significant (Brousseau, 
2002). 
 
Consequently, the disintermediation assumption is not entirely justified since it is stated only in terms 
of cost reduction (transaction costs theory), without tackling the question of the added value of 
intermediation and the role of the intermediary as an economic agent (Benda, 2004; Tran, 2004). 
 
2.2 From electronic intermediation to infomediation 
 
The previous analysis leads us to conclude the following: while it is clear that the existence of the 
intermediaries is not threatened, it is also clear that their role has to change considerably (Bailey and 
Bakos, 1997). Consequently, one can expect an adaptation of the traditional intermediaries to the new 
needs generated by the information society, but also the emergence of new virtual actors with a 
tendency to exploit specific niches (Brousseau, 2002). 
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The so-called “re-intermediation theory” finds its roots in the latter observation. It comes as a reaction 
to the preceding disintermediation theory, which is considered as too peremptory and not realistic 
enough. Behind the re-intermediation term thus hides the electronic intermediation which, as we 
mentioned earlier, is inherent in IIS. IIS turn out to be essential from a strategic point of view, since 
information on the Internet reaches an extreme level of complexity (in quantitative as well as 
qualitative terms), which casts serious doubts on the earlier argument according to which the Internet 
minimizes search costs (Giaglis, 2002). In addition, IIS represent a significant medium for firms 
confronted with an increasingly uncertain environment, as it allows sharing information in a very 
short period of time (Baumard and Benvenuti, 1998). 
 
An electronic marketplace (EMP) is defined as an IIS that allows and facilitates Internet-based 
commercial relationships among multiple buyers and sellers (Akoka and Lang, 2002). Concretely, 
EMPs are virtual shopping malls. In the existing literature, it is usual to find EMP and online 
information platform (OIP) used as synonyms (Benda, 2004). However, we wish here to establish a 
distinction between these two virtual entities. While an EMP clearly allows participants to trade 
directly among themselves, the OIP only aims at providing information (Spulber, 2003). In the 
present article, we refer to an OIP as any system whose objective is to collect the information 
available on particular products and services in order to present it in a comprehensive, organized, 
synthetic and easily accessible form, to the attention of the buyer. Consequently, it represents an 
information tool and not a transaction tool, as is the case for an EMP. An OIP can thus be considered 
as a type of innovating intermediary thanks to which information, relayed on the Internet via its 
platform (the online directory), gains in credibility (Oxley and Yeung, 2001). To support this 
terminological differentiation, the literature has coined the term of « infomediary », which usefully 
characterizes an OIP. 
 
An infomediary is traditionally defined as a merchant of information. As illustrated on Figure 1, this 
information concerns either the buyer (case 1) or the supplier (case 2) of goods and services. In case 
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1, the infomediary collects data concerning a particular population of buyers, he analyses and 
structures this data to obtain useful information that he then sells to a supplier, which is directly 
concerned with the population and the corresponding market (Ngo Mai and Raybaut, 2005). Hence, 
the infomediary in contact with the market follows the evolution and the tendency of this market and 
contributes to a certain extent to the development of the offer (Giaglis, 2002). In case 2, the 
infomediary collects data about multiple producers and suppliers of the same good or service in order 
to propose this data, after treatment, to the potential buyers present on this market segment and 
requesting a high degree of transparency and comparability of information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Configuration of the infomediation and structure of flows 
 
For infomediation to exist, it is necessary that the activity add some value, exactly as for traditional 
intermediation (Benda, 2003). If information relates to the buyer side (case 1), there is room for an 
infomediary only if the supplier is not able to observe, to collect and to treat the data itself. If 
information relates to the seller side (case 2), the infomediation activity is useful if it is difficult for a 
buyer to observe the whole supply of goods and services (this can be attributed to various reasons: 
very fragmented market, difficult access to information, lack of time, consumer not very inclined to 
support the research costs, etc.). 
 
As an illustration, web sites such as toprural.com or ruraltrip.com are online directories and act as 
infomediaries in the nature-based tourism sector. Information concerns the supply of tourism services 
 
S 
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: Information : Data
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as noted above (referred to hereafter as the « suppliers ») and is proposed to people organizing a city 
trip or any other kind of holiday (the « buyers »); it is useful to recall that the tourism sector benefits 
considerably from the possibilities offered by the Internet. Indeed, a large range of transactions related 
to the tourism sector is nowadays very common (buying plane tickets on the web; participating to 
holidays online auctions; searching sunny destinations on the web instead of using paper catalogues; 
etc). In such a context, the presence of an OIP can therefore prove to be necessary and justified. 
 
 
General 
Interorganizational 
Systems  
Information 
(IIS) 
 
Category 
Electronic Marketplaces 
(EMP) 
Online Information 
Platform (OIP) 
 
Example 
Online Booking Centre 
(OBC) 
Online Directories 
(OD) 
 
Activity 
Intermediation Infomediation 
 
Figure 2: Organization of concepts (acronyms) 
 
In the online tourism sector, EMP can also be identified as online booking centers (OBC), i.e. virtual 
travel agencies on which it is possible to choose a product, to carry out the reservation, and even to 
secure the payment of the stay by electronic payment. As for the case of traditional agencies, OBC are 
remunerated on the basis of a commission, which is generally directly integrated by marking up the 
basic price of the product established by the supplier. Contrary to the OIP, an EMP, such as the OBC, 
does not support informational transparency. Firstly, regarding product information, we have already 
noted that OBC do not post the real prices of the products or services: prices include an additional fee 
(the commission) that is meant to compensate the OBC for its services. Secondly, regarding 
information about suppliers, OBC maintain it secret in order to prevent buyers from directly 
contacting suppliers and thereby, bypassing the OBC’s intermediation. Indeed, an increasing number 
of suppliers are equipped in computer systems, which allows them to manage themselves the requests 
and services related to the booking. Figure 2 summarizes the comparison between EMP and OIP. 
 9
In Section 5, we continue to present differences between theses virtual places. We now turn to the 
analysis of the relationships between participants in the same platform. 
 
3. Coopetition on an online information platform 
 
Before analyzing the links existing between OIP participants, we will first see why these different 
actors join an OIP. As for a buyer, the benefit of joining an OIP is twofold. Firstly, the buyer has 
access to a large number of suppliers in a single place, which clearly reduces his search costs. Indeed, 
as we mentioned before, the profusion of information currently available on the Internet does not 
make it possible any more to consider this medium of communication as a low search cost tool. Let us 
notice that if the monetary cost has strongly dropped (because telecommunication tariffs have been in 
constant fall over the last years), the search cost due to the constant growth of the mass of information 
on the Internet appreciably increased (as Varian et Lyman -2002- document it, 550 billion new 
documents and more than 7,5 million Web pages are created every day). Secondly, the buyer is 
confronted with information coming straight from the supplier, which guarantees prices that are not 
skewed by a commissioning mechanism and also a direct bond with the supplier to start a transaction. 
 
Concerning the supplier, his interest is economic as well as strategic. The economic advantage stems 
from the fact that by joining an OIP the supplier partly externalizes his promotion function to an 
agent, which carries it out at a lower cost (economies of scale) and facilitates coordination between 
the two sides of the market. Participating in an OIP also yields strategic benefits as it allows the 
supplier to access new markets and thus to gain new market shares at the expense of suppliers who 
remain outside the OIP (Benda, 2004). However, the supplier who joins an OIP is forced to share 
these competitive advantages with the rival suppliers who already joined the OIP. 
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In her work about EMP, Benda identifies three types of suppliers on the basis of their perception of 
the stakes they have in the collaboration: refractories, non refractories and proactives (Benda, 2004). 
Instead of giving a formal definition for each category, we adapt it hereafter to our OIP model in the 
nature-based tourism sector. 
 
Refractory suppliers are not present on an OIP because they consider that their own online promotion 
methods –generally a homemade web site– or their other advertising campaigns are largely sufficient. 
In the majority of the cases, these suppliers ensure an effective presence on the Internet by using their 
advanced competences in computer science. By doing this and despite lower means than those 
implemented by the OIP, they attract enough visitors to be satisfied. 
 
Non refractory suppliers are participating in the OIP as long as their participation in it gets them a 
higher turnover. Moreover, they require that the profits be higher than the cost of participation. If the 
OIP is in its development stage, such suppliers minimize their participation (for example by 
subscribing to the free promotion formula) while waiting to see whether the OIP’s development will 
be beneficial for them or not. 
 
Proactive suppliers are also on the OIP. They consider that the OIP can help them at various levels. 
Firstly, they are convinced that as an actor of the nature-based tourism sector, a successful presence 
on the Internet is essential. Secondly, they find the OIP useful to benefit from a virtual quality 
window, which will give a positive image of their services. Thirdly, they note an increase of buyers’ 
requests and so of their sales, even if it is difficult to quantify these repercussions. 
 
Whether they are non-refractory or proactive, suppliers collaborate in the construction and the 
development of the OIP simply through their participation in it. From this point of view, it seems 
correct to say that they act like partners pursuing a common goal: the mutualisation of means in order 
to conquer a larger share of the market. However, from the fact that these suppliers propose services 
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and products relating to the same sector (possibility of comparability), they remain competitors. 
Actually, we wish to underline the paradoxical character of an ambivalent relation between several 
suppliers active on the same market, which can be established conceptually in two steps: initially, 
cooperation between economic agents to achieve a satisfactory common goal for all (in the present 
case, an increase in the market size); then, competition between the same agents in order to enjoy 
individually the benefits of the cooperation (here, the largest possible share of the market). 
 
Such a competing collaboration is usually justified by three goals: the research of a critical size, the 
costs mutualisation and the introduction of barriers for new entrants (Tran, 2004). For the nature-
based tourism sector, the research of a critical size is fundamental since the sector is represented by 
many private owners, often with a one-product offer and for which the tourism activity is 
complementary to a principal one (e.g., agriculture). In this context, it is easy to understand that cost 
mutualisation appears as a natural way to a widened and effective action. Lastly, given that the sector 
under review remains largely open (the supply increases significantly every year), the participation to 
an OIP can, from a strategic point of view, be used to avoid strong competition by establishing 
barriers to entry. 
 
(2 suppliers et 1 OIP) 
S2 participates in 
the OIP 
S2 does not 
participate in the 
OIP 
S1 participates in 
the OIP 
Coopetition Advantage in S1 
S1 does not 
participate in the 
OIP 
Advantage in S2 Competition 
 
Figure 3: Competition and coopetition 
 
The main characteristic of the coopetition phenomenon (Koenig, 1996; Nalebuff and Brandenburger, 
1996) is to combine simultaneously a collective strategy (cooperation, i.e. participation to the same 
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OIP and contribution of each supplier to the development of this OIP) and several individual 
strategies (competition as the participants to the same OIP remain competitors with one another). 
Coopetition is a helpful theory to analyze tourism economics and strategy. Moreover, the concept has 
been recently used in the case of tourism firms (Pesämaa and Eriksson, 2006; Della Corte and 
Sciarelli, 2006). 
 
Figure 3 illustrates this concept starting from two competing suppliers active on the same market and 
potentially on the same OIP. If the two agents stay out from the OIP, they play the traditional game of 
competition. If only one of the suppliers join the OIP, then he has a competitive advantage over the 
other, insofar as he benefits alone from the entire common infrastructure created. However, it is 
obvious that for this participation to be transformed into a durable competitive advantage, it is 
necessary that the OIP gives itself the means of being known from the market. Lastly, as we already 
described it, if both suppliers join the OIP, they play the ambivalent game of coopetition: competition 
is strong because suppliers are on an equal foot, but joint participation makes the OIP more attractive 
for buyers, which increases expected profits for both suppliers. 
 
We now develop an industrial organization model to formalize this situation and also to consider the 
pricing strategy of the OIP owner. 
 
4. A formal model of coopetition on an OIP 
 
Let us start with a simplified situation with only two suppliers of rural accommodation, noted i and j, 
and a single infomediary The inverse demand function for the service provided by supplier i is given 
by pi=1+mi-qi-dqj, where 
• pi is the price for one unit of service (say, e.g., one night per person in the accommodation), 
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• qi and qj are the quantities of service provided respectively by suppliers i and j (these 
quantities can be thought of as the accommodation capacity, e.g., the number of rooms or of 
beds) 
• d∈(0,1) is an inverse measure of product differentiation between the services of the two 
suppliers (the lower d, the more services are differentiated; for d=0, the two services are 
totally differentiated and the two demands are independent; at the other extreme, for d=1, the 
two services are seen as perfectly substitutable), and 
• mi indicates the "market-exposure" (or "brand recognition") of service i (the larger mi, the 
higher the willingness to pay of each consumer whatever the quantities qi and qj produced by 
the firms). 
 
Before competing à la Cournot on the product market (i.e., suppliers simultaneously set their quantity, 
taking the quantity of the rival as given), suppliers decide whether or not to adhere to an infomediary 
of the type of ruraltrip.com. The infomediary charges suppliers a fixed fee F for registration. Being 
listed on the infomediary's website has the effect of increasing the supplier's market exposure (with 
respect to self-promotion via other means). Moreover, infomediation generates network effects insofar 
as each supplier's exposure further increases when the other supplier also registers with the 
infomediary. As explained above, such network effects can be justified by scale and scope economies 
in promotional activities enjoyed by the infomediary, and because consumers are willing to pay more 
for both services when they are given the opportunity to compare them more easily. We translate this 
idea by assuming that mi=0 when supplier i does not adhere to the infomediary, mi=m when supplier i 
is the only supplier who adheres to the infomediary, and mi=M when both suppliers adhere to the 
infomediary, with 0<m<M. 
 
In sum, we consider the following three-stage game: in the first stage, the infomediary sets the 
registration fee F; in the second stage, the two suppliers observe F and simultaneously decide whether 
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or not to join the infomediary; in the third stage, given the level of market exposure of the two services 
that follows from second-stage decisions, the two suppliers choose the quantity of services they 
provide. We solve the game backwards for its subgame-perfect Nash equilibria. 
 
We start by solving the Cournot game suppliers play at stage 3. Assuming for simplicity that the 
marginal cost of production is equal to zero for both suppliers,1 supplier i's profit function writes as 
πi=(1+mi-qi-dqj)qi. Setting to zero the derivative of profit with respect to qi, we derive supplier i's 
reaction function: qi(qj)=(1/2) (1+mi-dqj). Proceeding in a similar way, we derive supplier j's reaction 
function as: qj(qi)=(1/2) (1+mj-dqi). Solving for the system of equations in two unknowns given by the 
two reaction functions, one finds the Nash equilibrium quantities: 
qi*=(2-d+2 mi-d mj)/(4-d2)   and qj*=(2-d+2 mj-d mi)/(4-d2). 
Some simple manipulations show that equilibrium profits are equal to the square of equilibrium 
quantities: πi*=(qi*)2. In the above expressions, the exact values of mi and mj depend on the adhesion 
decisions made by the suppliers at stage 2. There are four subgames to consider: (1) if no supplier 
adheres to the infomediary, then mi= mj=0; (2) and (3) if supplier i (resp. j) adheres while supplier j 
(resp. i) does not, then mi=m and mj=0; (4) if both suppliers adhere to the infomediary, then mi= mj=M. 
Substituting the previous values in the equilibrium profits, we obtain the following payoff matrix, 
which we will use to solve stages 1 and 2. (We assume that m < (2-d)/d to guarantee positive 
equilibrium quantities in all instances). 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Alternatively, prices can be interpreted as mark-ups over the marginal cost. 
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Before looking for the equilibrium adhesion decisions at stage 2, we want to illustrate what 
coopetition means in the present setting. As explained in the previous section, coopetition mixes some 
form of cooperation (which is translated here by the assumption that M>m: market exposure is larger 
when both suppliers register with the infomediary) and of competition (adhesion decisions are 
strategic: they are carried out with a view to affecting the environment in which product market 
competition is played). To assess how these two opposite forces balance each other, we compute how 
equilibrium profit changes when the other supplier also registers with the infomediary. Simple 
computations establish that: 
 
 
 
In the latter inequality, the left-hand side, ∆m, is the percentage increase in market exposure generated 
by the other supplier's presence on the website (it measures the network effect). The threshold on the 
right-hand side, t(d), is a decreasing function of the degree of product substitutability d. 
 
The inequality is interpreted as follows: when the network effect is strong enough (∆m> t(d)), the 
cooperation effect dominates the competition effect and each supplier welcomes the rival's registration 
with the infomediary; otherwise, the competition effect dominates and each supplier would rather 
remain the only subscriber to the infomediary's service. In the latter case, the benefit of increased 
exposure is more than offset by the fact that the rival supplier also enjoys the same benefit and 
becomes thereby a stronger competitor on the product market. Note that this situation is more likely to 
arise the larger the value of d. Indeed, when d increases, the two accommodation services become 
closer substitutes, competition is fiercer and as t(d) increases, the inequality is satisfied for a narrower 
region of parameters. As an illustration, the inequality is always met when services are totally 
differentiated (d=0) as t(0)=0. At the other extreme, t(1)=1, meaning that a 100% increase in market 
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exposure is necessary to have the cooperation effect dominating the competition effect when the 
service is homogeneous. 
 
We now turn to stage 2 of the game. If we suppose first that registration with the intermediary is free 
(F=0), then we can show that it is a dominant strategy for each supplier to adhere to the infomediary. 
So, under free registration, the unique Nash equilibrium is such that both suppliers adhere. The 
analysis is slightly more complex when registration is not free. Consequently, for the sake of the 
exposition, we choose arbitrary values for two parameters, namely d=1/2 and m=1. The payoff matrix 
rewrites then as: 
 
 
Comparing payoffs, we can characterize the Nash equilibrium at stage 2 according to the value taken 
by F and M: 
• No supplier adheres if and only if F ≥ (196-36)/225 = 0.711 = F1; 
• A single supplier adheres if and only if (i) F ≤ F1, and (ii) F ≥ (36(M+1)2-16)/225 = F2; it can 
readily be checked that for these two inequalities to define an open interval (i.e., for F2 < F1), it 
is necessary that M < 1.211; 
• Both suppliers adhere if and only if F ≤ F2. 
 
The intuition behind these results is straightforward. When the network effect is not too strong (1=m < 
M < 1.211), there are three possible Nash equilibria: for a low registration fee, both suppliers adhere, 
for an intermediate fee, only one supplier does, and for a high fee, no supplier adheres. For stronger 
network effects, there is no fee such that only one supplier adheres: they both adhere (low fee) or they 
both refrain from doing so (high fee). 
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We are now in a position to derive the infomediary's optimal conduct in the first stage of the game. We 
distinguish between two cases. When the network effect is strong (i.e., for M > 1.211), either both 
suppliers register or none of them does: the infomediary's optimum is thus clearly to choose a 
registration fee just below F2 and have both suppliers adhering. On the other hand, when the network 
effect is not so strong (i.e., for M < 1.211), the infomediary has the additional possibility of setting the 
higher fee F1 so as to attract a single supplier. This would be the optimal option if F1 > 2 F2. Simple 
computations establish that the latter inequality is equivalent to 5-6M-3M2 > 0, which is never satisfied 
as, by assumption, M > m = 1. We therefore conclude that the infomediary always finds it optimal to 
set a low registration fee so as to attract the two suppliers. This conclusion is, however, particular to 
the present special case, as we now discuss. 
 
The previous model can easily be generalized to an arbitrary number of suppliers, N >2, by letting the 
exposure parameter mi be equal to α n when supplier i adheres to the infomediary along with (n-1) 
other suppliers (where α >0) and, as before, equal to zero when supplier i does not adhere. As above, 
we solve the three-stage game backwards. Supposing that n (with 0 < n < N) suppliers have joined the 
infomediary at stage 2 of the game, we denote by πin(n) the equilibrium profit at stage 3 of a typical 
supplier who joined the infomediary (and who is thus is among the n “in” suppliers); similarly, let 
πout(n) denote the equilibrium profit of a typical supplier who did not join the infomediary (and who is 
thus among the N-n “out” suppliers). 
 
Let us first give a more precise assessment of the coopetition phenomenon. As above, we want to 
assess how a member's equilibrium profit changes when an additional supplier joins the infomediary. 
We therefore compute the difference πin(n+1)- πin(n). Focusing here on the case of homogeneous 
products (i.e., d=1), we can readily establish that the change in profit is positive if and only if the 
infomediary comprises less than half of the population of suppliers (i.e., if n < N/2). The corollary of 
this result is that, as the infomediary grows larger than this critical size, the equilibrium profit of each 
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member decreases when an additional firm joins the infomediary. The intuition for this result is akin 
to the one we described in the case with two suppliers. In such a setting, the enlargement of the 
infomediary’s member base induces two simultaneous contrasting effects on the members' profits: on 
the one hand, the members benefit from the increase in the demand they face (a positive “exposure 
effect”), but on the other hand, they suffer from increased competition due to the increased demand 
that their competitors enjoy as well (a negative “competition effect”). As a result, there is a critical 
size after which the admission of new members in an infomediary has an adverse effect on the initial 
members' profit. 
 
Now, turning to stage 1 of the game, we would like to measure how much a supplier is willing to pay 
in order to become the nth member of the infomediary. This supplier would be willing to pay up to its 
change in profits: f(n) ≡ πin(n)- πout(n-1), i.e., the difference between the profit after joining the 
infomediary (when n suppliers are with the infomediary) and the profit before joining (when only n-1 
were with the infomediary). It can be shown that f(n) first increases with n, then reaches a maximum 
and then starts to decrease with n; the reason for the decrease is to be found in the competition effect 
which makes πin(n) decrease with n for n > N/2. The function f(n) can be interpreted as a demand 
function for the infomediary’s services: for a given quantity of service (i.e., for a given number n of 
members), f(n) indicates the highest price (i.e., membership fee) at which the service can be sold. The 
optimal level of the membership fee can thus be indirectly obtained by letting the infomediary select 
the optimal number of members, i.e., the number n* that maximizes the infomediary’s profit, Π(n) = 
nf(n). Some line of computations establish that the first derivative of Π(n) with respect to n is negative 
at n=N. This implies that the infomediary never finds it profitable to induce full membership: the 
infomediary’s optimum is to attract a strict subset of the existing pool of suppliers. The intuition for 
this result is again to be found in the coopetition phenomenon. 
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In the next section, we extend the discussion to a setting where several intermediaries compete for 
both suppliers and buyers. In particular, we consider the entry of an OIP in a business environment in 
which another intermediary is already active. 
 
5. Platform competition: a collective competitive game 
 
Several empirical studies show the importance of the competing advantages related to the 
participation in an EMP (Benda, 2003; Brousseau, 2002) and of the integration of the Internet  –and 
the ICT in general– to the strategy of the firm (Fernández and Nieto, 2005). However, if one considers 
the same market or common branch of industry, it is possible to meet several EMP, which enter 
mutually in competition (Tran, 2004). This latter phenomenon can be seen as a move of competition 
from an individual dimension (agent against agent) to a collective dimension (platform against 
platform). 
 
In order to shed some light on this platform competition, we can rely on the industrial organization 
theory and its concept of two-sided market. Indeed, with online platforms we are in the presence of 
positive indirect network effects since the more agents are on one side of the platform (e.g., 
suppliers), the higher the agents’ utility on the other side (e.g., buyers). In the previous section, we 
developed a model with only one intermediary. Now, we intend to see what occurs when a second 
intermediary enters the market. 
 
We apply again our analysis to the nature-based tourism sector. As described in Section 2, we can 
identify two types of IIS in this sector: online booking centres (OBC) and online directories (OD). To 
understand how these two types of IIS may compete with one another, we first need to deepen the 
characterization of their similarities and differences (as summarized in Figure 4). 
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At first glance, OIP and EMP seem to be relatively similar since both are electronic places that 
provide higher “market-exposure” to the seller and attract a great number of buyers. Nevertheless, 
their roles are quite different. In the one hand, EMP act as traditional intermediaries, which means 
that they do not just play a role of matching both sides of the market. They provide a complete service 
from the beginning to the finalization of the transaction, so that both sides never enter directly in 
contact. For providing this service, EMP generally charge a commission, which represents transaction 
costs and a profit margin. On the other hand, OIP only play an information role. They do not care 
whether the transaction works successfully out, but they improve coordination between the two sides 
of the market, allowing buyers and sellers to manage the whole transaction by themselves. In this 
latter case, it is not longer possible for the infomediary to control transactions, so that they prefer to 
charge one or both sides of the market with a fixed fee. So, we retain, for the analysis to follow, that 
an EMP set prices charged for usage and that an OIP set a system of membership fees (Rochet and 
Tirole, 2004). 
 
 
EMP (OBC) 
 
 
OIP (OD) 
 
Ensures a restrictive promotion 
(without informational 
transparency) 
Ensures a wide promotion (with 
informational transparency) 
Becomes actor of the transaction Remains outside the transaction 
Endorse responsibilities as for the 
realization of the transaction 
Endorses responsibilities as for the 
veracity of information 
The intermediation cost is 
generally supported by the buyer 
The infomediation cost is generally 
supported by the supplier 
 
Figure 4: Some major differences between EMP and OIP (nature-based tourism sector) 
 
 
Figure 4 presents the most outstanding differences between an EMP and an OIP as we conceive them 
here. This shows that these two different IIS do not respond to identical needs. In fact, an EMP is 
more specifically addressed to a supplier who wants to outsource his sale function, whereas an OIP 
responds to a promotion need. Hence, while a supplier who is not able (or does not want) to ensure 
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transactions tends to join an EMP, a supplier who is not able (or does not want) to ensure its 
promotion function tends to join an OIP.1  
 
We now turn to the nature-based tourism market structure and our concrete business examples. Some 
OD as toprural.com or ruraltrip.com are profit-maximizing infomediaries (private venture), so that 
they should optimize their revenues. Thus, with a membership fee system, the maximizing solution is 
to attract many participants paying the fee, independently from the number of interactions (we assume 
realistically that in the case of an OIP, agents are not charged for usage; usage is indeed hard to 
monitor or to quantity because transactions are conducted outside the platform). Things are different 
with an EMP. Indeed, an OBC as a profit-maximizing intermediary has to maximize the number of 
transactions. However, since we are in a two-sided market, the decision of joining the platform from 
one side depends on the expected size of the other side. As shown, e.g., by Armstrong (2004), an 
intermediary may subsidize one side of the market in order to generate a higher volume of trade and 
thus a higher profit. We also demonstrated in the previous section that an infomediary finds it optimal 
to set low registration fees so as to attract a large number of potential suppliers. For instance, 
ruraltrip.com decided to proceed in several successive steps. Firstly, the firm referred for free on its 
website all the officially recognized owners (but with only one of their different accommodations). 
This basic service is called “Simple Trip”. At the same time, web surfers can visit the site for free and 
find the information through an adapted research browser. We thus observe that an OD let both 
market sides of the market access for free. Obviously, this leads to a growth of the potential buyers’ 
number since the website proposes a large amount of accommodations and relevant information in 
comparison with OBCs. Secondly, in consequence of the first move, suppliers find it interesting to be 
confronted with so many potential buyers and therefore have a willingness to pay in order to be more 
visible. Clearly, as “Simple Trip” is a free service both for buyers and for suppliers, it cannot 
                                                 
1 Clearly, reality is a bit more complex than that as an EMP also achieves a promotional role, and as sellers have 
the opportunity to simultaneously register with and EMP and an OIP (for instance, a supplier may go to an OIP 
because this gives him a larger promotion scope, and simultaneously adhere to an EMP in order to increase his 
sales). The latter phenomenon is usually referred to as “multihoming”. Considering the complexities resulting 
from multihoming (which can also exist on the buyers’ side) goes beyond the scope of the present analysis. 
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represent a viable business model in the long term. However, by attracting a large number of buyers, 
it makes it possible to charge suppliers for advanced services. That is why ruraltrip.com has set up the 
“Gold Trip” service (alike “Silver” and “Gold” Promotion in the case of toprural.com), which enables 
the owner to benefit from a preferential treatment with many advantages (e.g., all accommodations 
referred; individual page for every accommodation; complete description and pictures available; 
priority positioning in search results; personal owner account; etc.). In Section 4, we concluded by 
saying that a platform does not have any interest in full membership. Clearly, if all the owners 
subscribe to the “Gold Trip” service the preferential treatment disappears and there is no competitive 
advantage anymore. Such a situation can arise when the membership fee is set at such a low level that 
everyone finds it interesting to pay. Again, because of a different pricing model, an OBC works 
according to different rules, but is active on the same market and, therefore, competes with OD for 
both buyers and suppliers. 
 
Let us now have a closer look at the competition between an EMP and an OIP. As we just showed, 
“platform competition” is particular in that both IIS simultaneously compete on both sides of the 
market. They both try to get a large number of buyers and a large number of sellers “on board”, 
knowing that each side is more willing to participate the larger is the participation of the other side. 
Additional complexities, here, come from the facts that (i) EMP and OIP offer differentiated services 
and use different pricing modes, and (ii) buyers and sellers keep the opportunity to transact directly, 
i.e., without using the intermediation services provided by the EMP or the OIP. 
 
To model the situation under review, suppose that the buyer’s opportunity cost to transact without any 
intermediary (say ‘r’) is lower than the commission (say ‘c’) announced by the intermediary (recall 
that contrary to ruraltrip.com, an OBC charges the buyers side). In this case, the buyer has a clear 
incentive to transact directly with the supplier so as to avoid the costs for using the platform set up by 
the intermediary. Thus, the buyer will join the OIP since it allows him to find the relevant information 
and to contact directly the supplier, and so to benefit from the intrinsic price of the accommodation 
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(say ‘p’). However, note that the buyer is not always aware of all the alternatives, so that he may 
transact on an EMP even if normally he would prefer to pay no commission and transact himself 
directly, supporting by the way the transaction costs. 
 
Suppose now that both intermediaries benefit from the same “brand-recognition” (they have equal 
chances to be joined by either the suppliers or the buyers) and propose exactly the same products. 
Moreover, whether joining an OIP or an OBC, the supplier sets the same price p. From the buyer’s 
point of view, the most explicit difference between both IIS is the price difference. One more time, 
the buyer will transact through the OBC only if the following inequality is true: p+c<p+r, so if c<r. 
If c=r the buyer is indifferent between both platforms. Alternatively, note that if c>r is true for all the 
buyers, than the size of OBC’s buyer side will decrease to zero and the OBC will disappear from the 
market. In such a world, there exist only equilibria in which all buyers and sellers go to a single 
marketplace, the OIP. This result is similar to what Caillaud and Jullien (2003) predict about price 
competition between similar two-sided platforms. 
 
6. Discussion and research questions 
 
In this paper, we introduce various business issues related to intermediation and electronic markets. 
First, even if intermediaries will continue to play a role in the digital economy, we note that they will 
be increasingly confronted to infomediation. Indeed, infomediaries emerge nowadays as a new 
category of intermediaries in a business context where buyers and sellers interact more easily with 
one another but still need to process a lot of information. Second, whether they are buyers or sellers, 
participants in the same virtual platform are in a particular position since they cooperate to the 
collective success of the platform while they remain competitors. We refer to the strategic concept of 
‘coopetition’ to describe this ambivalent reality. Third, we develop an economic model built on 
industrial organization theory and considering a platform as a two-sided market. The main analytical 
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results drawn from this simple model are that (i) suppliers might suffer from the participation of other 
suppliers in the same platform (because the competition effect might be stronger than the demand 
expansion effect), and (ii) the platform owner never finds it optimal to attract all suppliers. Fourth, 
differentiated platforms can be present in a single market and compete with each other. We also note 
the importance of the pricing structures and of market exposure. 
 
A number of testable hypotheses come out of this article and pave the way for future research: 
 
• On an OIP (resp. EMP), the infomediation (resp. intermediation) cost is supported by the 
supplier (resp. the buyer); 
• When an OIP and an EMP coexist, buyers tend to multihome (i.e., register with various IIS), 
whereas suppliers might multihome in the short run, but prefer to singlehome with the OIP in 
the long run; 
• Beyond competition between various types of IIS, there exist positive externalities between 
their activities, which are advantageous for each of them. 
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